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Baruch: Constitutional Law: Permitting Virtual Child Pornography--A First

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PERMITTING VIRTUAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY-A FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT,
BAD POLICY, OR BOTH?
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,535 U.S. 234 (2002)
Jason Baruch*
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996' (CPPA) prohibits
distribution and possession of any image that "is, or appears to be, of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."2 Not only does the statute
ban images depicting actual minors engaging in such conduct, but it also
prohibits images of acts performed by adults who appear to be minors.'
Furthermore, the entity in the image may be wholly computer-generated.
Claiming that the CPPA was unconstitutionally overbroad, the Free
Speech Coalition5 sued the U.S. Department of Justice in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.6 The district court
upheld the CPPA's constitutionality.' The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute was substantially
overbroad!8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.9 The
Court HELD that, given its substantial overbreadth, the CPPA was
unconstitutional.'°
Notwithstanding the instant case, the holdings of prior cases
consistently extended the prohibitions against those who distribute or
* For my parents, Joseph and Carolyn Baruch.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2256 (1996).
2. Id. § 2256(8)(B) (2001).
3. Id. For example, a proscribed image might include an act performed by a young,
underdeveloped adult. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B); see also Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241 ("The
section captures a range of depictions ...called 'virtual child pornography'....").
5. The Free Speech Coalition is an organization formed during the Great Depression. It was
a result of the interests of pro-labor, immigrant, and religious minority groups striving to safeguard
freedom of expression. See, e.g., Geoffrey D. Berman, Note, A New Dealfor Free Speech: Free
Speech and the Labor Movement in the 1930s, 80 VA. L. REv. 291, 306 (1994).
6. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, No. C97-0281VSC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212, at * I *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997).
7. Id. at *23.
8. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Interestingly, there
was a circuit court split concerning the CPPA's constitutionality. "[F]our other Court of Appeals
have sustained it." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
9. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001).
10. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
1073
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possess child pornography." The Court in Miller v. California2
expounded a test to determine whether certain speech falls under the lessprotected category of "obscenity."13 In Miller, the defendant advertised
adult pornography in the form of illustrated books. 4 The Court held that
material is obscene only if it satisfies three elements. 5 First, an average
person 6 must deem the work 7 as appealing to the prurient interest. 8
Second, the work must depict, in a "patently offensive way," sexual
conduct that the applicable state law proscribes. 9 Finally, the work must
lack value.2"
Although Miller proffered an improved test for detecting obscenity, 2'
the Court later, in New York v. Ferber,2 held that the test was inapplicable
to child pornography cases. 23 Ferber dealt with a New York criminal
statute 24 that disallowed knowingly distributing depictions of a child's

11. Compare New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982) (proscribing the distribution
of child pornography), andOsborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (extending Ferber to prohibit mere
possession of child pornography), with Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 244 (failing to extend
the ban to virtual child pornography).
12. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
13. Id. at 24. The Court explained that "no majority of the Court has at any given time been
able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject
to regulation under the States' police power." Id. at 22; see also id. (asserting that the Court, faced
with the task of formulating a test for obscenity, has "seen 'avariety of views among the members
of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication."' (quoting Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,704-05 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring & dissenting))); Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967). But cf Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 (conceding that Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), was a notable attempt, before Miller, to formulate a workable
test for dealing with obscenity).
14. 413 U.S. at 16. At the time, disseminating obscene material was a misdemeanor in
California. Id.
15. Id. at 24.
16. Such i person would apply a view representative of "'contemporary community
standards."' Id. (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
17. The finder of fact is to judge the work "as a whole." Id. (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 24-25 (enumerating four categories of valuable works: literary, artistic,
political,
and scientific). Note that Miller's third element, which requires a national standard, contrasts with
the first, calling for a "community" standard. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 508 (1987); see
also supra note 16 and accompanying text. The Court in Miller remanded the case to the appellate
court to determine whether any such value inhered in the defendant's publications. Miller, 413 U.S.
at 37.
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
23. Id.at 761.
24. Id. at 750 (quoting N.Y.PENAL LAW § 263.05 (McKinney 1980) (current version at N.Y.
PENAL LAW 263 (1999))).
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sexual performance.25 Interestingly, non-obscene materials could be
included in the ambit of the statute.26 The Court held that, given the state's
interest in protecting minors, the Miller test does not apply to child
pornography cases."
The Court in Ferber enumerated five considerations supporting its
reasoning.28 First, the state has a compelling interest in safeguarding, both
physically and psychologically, the well-being of children.29 Second, the
distribution of child pornography is directly related to the sexual abuse of
children."a Third, the promotion and sale of these materials provide a
monetary incentive for producing illegal child pornography.3 Fourth, such
materials have little value.32 Fifth, denying protection to child pornography
is consistent with precedent.33
A more recent case, Osborne v. Ohio,34 reaffirmed Ferber'srationale
and extended its holding." In Osborne, police discovered in the
defendant's home sexually explicit photographs ofminors.36 The issue was
whether Ohio could prohibit the mere possession of child pornography.37
Interestingly, the Court held that Ohio could prohibit possession.38 The
Court reasoned that, given current conditions, proscribing production and

25. Id. Specifically, only children under the age of sixteen fell within the purview of the
statute. Id.
26. See id. at 749-50.
27. Id. at 761 ("We therefore cannot conclude that the Miller standard is a satisfactory
solution to the child pornography problem.").
28. Id. at 756-64.
29. Id. at 756-57.
30. Id. at 759. The Court specified that this relationship is apparent in two ways. Id. First,
such "materials produced are a permanent record" of a child's participation in lewd activity. Id.
Second, "the distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of
material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled." Id.
Another way in which child pornography is related to child sexual abuse is that it may "whet [] the
appetites" of pedophiles. See infra note 89. For empirical evidence supporting this possibility, see
MYERS, infra note 96.
31. Id. at 761.
32. See id. at 762; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
33. See Ferber,458 U.S. at 763 ("'The question whether speech is... protected by the First
Amendment ... depends on the content of the speech."') (quoting Young v. American Mini
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)).
34. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
35. See, e.g., id. at 108 (upholding Ferber'sfourth element).
36. Id. at 107. Ajury convicted the defendant and the trial court sentenced him to six months
in prison. Id.
37. Id. at 108.
38. Id. at 11.
I But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that states
cannot prohibit "mere private possession of obscene material"). Osborne significantly narrowed
the reach of Stanley: "Stanley should not be read too broadly .... [S]tanley was a narrow holding."
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108.
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distribution of child pornography solves only a portion of the problem.39
The Court also must allow banning of the possession of child pornography,
since its market has become so clandestine and its producers so elusive.4"
Emphasizing the timeliness of its holding, the Court noted further that
nineteen states had already outlawed the possession of child
pornography.4
In contrast to Ferberand Osborne,the instant case failed to extend the
prohibitions on child pornography. 2 In overturning the CPPA, the instant
Court applied the overbreadth doctrine.43 The Court adduced several
reasons why the CPPA was overbroad.
Preliminarily, the Court established that the CPPA prohibits conduct
that is not obscene under the Miller test. 4 Materials appearing to depict
minors engaging in sexual activity need not appeal to the prurient interest,
nor do such materials necessarily display patent offensiveness.45 For
example, the CPPA might criminalize a sexually explicit picture in a
psychology manual that exhibits neither prurience nor patent
offensiveness. 6 Also, the CPPA could ban works that have
value-Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet,for example.47 Thus, if the CPPA
is not obscene according to Miller, its constitutionality must depend on
Ferberand Osborne, which prohibit some child pornography despite its
non-obscenity. 8
The Court next reasoned that the CPPA is invalid under Ferber and
Osborne because it fails to proscribe the conduct it purports to proscribe:
sexual abuse of children.49 The Court stated that virtual child pornography
does not, in its production, require the victimization of children.50 Notably,
the majority in Ferber and Osborne emphasized the importance of

39. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110.
40. See id. ("[T]he child pornography market has been driven underground; as a result, it is
now difficult . . . to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking production and
distribution.").
41. Id.atilO-11.
42. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
43. See id. at 244, 258. The Court applied the overbreadth principle as expounded in
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 244.
Broadrick asserted that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad ifthe overbreadth is "substantial."
Id. (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612).
44. Id. at 246 ("The CPPA . . . extends to images . . . without regard to the Miller
requirements.").
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 247 (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, sc. 2).
48. See supra text accompanying note 23.
49. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250 ("[Tlhe CPPA prohibits speech that records
no crime and creates no victims ... .
50. Id.
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protecting children from sexual exploitation."' The statute in the instant
case, however, would proscribe materials produced without the
exploitation of children. 2 Thus, the Court implied that the instant case is
distinguishable from precedent."
Similarly, the Court reasoned that, as worded, the CPPA would chill a
significant amount of protected speech. 4 For example, legitimate movie
producers might be at risk of violating the CPPA.55 The Court named two
recent award-winning movies that could, in their depicting of child-sexual
activity, run afoul of the CPPA 6 Emphasizing the CPPA's draconian
penalties,57 the Court claimed that few producers would risk
uttering even
58
statute.
the
of
ambit
the
nearing
speech
protected
arguably
Last, the instant Court impugned the'Government's four arguments
supporting the CPPA's constitutionality. 9 First, the Government argued
that virtual child pornography generally has no value.60 Second, pedophiles
may use it to seduce children.6 Third, it "whets the appetites" of
pedophiles.62 Finally, its similarity to actual child pornography makes it
difficult to prosecute actual child pornographers.63
The Court riposted by stating that child pornography may, in fact, have
significant value." Also, even though pedophiles may use virtual child
pornography for seduction purposes, there are many innocent materials,

51. Id. ("The Court[s] . . . anchored . . . [their] holding[s] in the concern for the
participants .... ). But cf. Adam J. Wasserman, Note, Virtual.Child.Porn. Com: Defending the
Constitutionality of the Criminalization ofComputer-Generated Child Pornography by the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996-A Reply to Professor Burke and Other Critics, 35 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 245, 262 (1998) ("The Ferber and Osborne balancing approach readily leads to the
conclusion that Congress can constitutionally criminalize computer-generated child
pornography .... ) (emphasis added).
52. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 244.
55. Id. at 247-48.
56. As examples, the Court named the movies AMERICAN BEAUTY (Jinks/Cohen Company
1994) and TRAFFIC (Beford Falls, Fifty Cannon, Gramercy Pictures, USA Films 2000). Id.
57. Under the CPPA, a court may impose a fifteen-year sentence on a first-time violator. 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(l) (2003). A repeat offender faces a five- to thirty-year sentence. Id.
58. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 244. But see infra text accompanying note 79.
59. Id. at 249-56.
60. Id. at 250.
61. Id. at 251.
62. Id. at 253.
63. Id. at 254.
64. Id. at 251; cf. id. (stating that Ferber would allow, in the case of valuable child
pornography, virtual images to substitute for actual images of achild's sexual conduct) (citing New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982)). More specifically, materials that one might deem "child
pornography" could appear in legitimate artistic productions, such as motion pictures. See supra
text accompanying notes 55-56.
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such as video games and cartoons, that pedophiles may use to seduce
children. 65 Additionally, the Government cannot prohibit virtual
pornography simply because it "whets appetites," since such a prohibition
would control private thoughts.66 Finally, the Court stated that proscribing
virtual child pornography because it 67frustrates prosecution would "turn[]
the First Amendment upside down.
While it is true that value may inhere in works depicting child sexual
activity, the CPPA would probably not proscribe such productions. Given
that "[w]ords inevitably contain germs of uncertainty, 68 courts use the
overbreadth doctrine sparingly. 69 For example, courts consult legislative
history before declaring overbreadth. 70 Doing so substantiates a
legislature's intentions. 7' Here, the CPPA's legislative history indicates
that Congress intended to reach only depictions of hard-core child
pornography. 72 Thus, the Court could have read the statute more narrowly
to exclude valuable productions.73
Moreover, there is evidence that the Government itself has, in fact, read
the CPPA narrowly to exclude the productions of legitimate movie
producers.74 Traffic and American Beauty are two examples of legitimate
movies that the Court claims would fall within the CPPA's purview.75
Traffic won an Academy Award in 2001 ;76 American Beauty won an
Academy award in 2000.77 Congress enacted the CPPA in 1996. 7' Thus,
the chill that the Court identifies "has apparently never been felt by those
who actually make movies. 79
65. Id.
66. Id. at 253. But see infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 255. But see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
68. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973).
69. Id. at 613 ("Application of the overbreadth doctrine.., is ...strong medicine. It has
been employed .. .sparingly and only as a last resort.") (emphasis added); cf Free Speech
Coalition,535 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("This Court has never required 'mathematical certainty' or 'meticulous specificity' from the
language of a statute.").
70. See, e.g., FreeSpeech Coalition,535 U.S. at 270-71 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("We
have looked to legislative history to limit the scope of child pornography statutes in the past, and
we should do so here as well.") (citation omitted).
71. See id. at 270 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 269-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 104-358, pt. I, at 7 (1996));
accordFree Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73-77 (1994).
73. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
75. See supra note 56.
76. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Even if the Government were to prosecute parties uttering protected
speech, courts generally do, on a "case-by-case analysis," correct the
misapplication of an overbroad statute."0 A fortiori, the CPPA provides
defendants with an affirmative defense8" that facilitates such correction. 2
This affirmative defense allows, inter alia, a defendant to assert that the
suspect images were produced using a person who was an adult at the time
of production. 3
Given the prospect of correcting any overbreadth (which is arguably
not substantial), 4 the Court could have upheld the CPPA because the state
has a compelling interest in prohibiting virtual child pornography. First,
virtual child pornography, just like actual child pornography, is used to
seduce children. 5 In fact, empirical findings show that pedophiles often
use child pornography for this purpose.8 6 These empirical data weigh
against the instant Court's a priori observation that pedophiles "might" use
innocent materials, like cartoons, to seduce children. 7 Child pornography

80. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973). In order to be correctable,
however, such a statute cannot be "substantial[ly]" overbroad. Id. at 615.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2001).
82. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 51, at 278 ("The CPPA's affirmative defense helps
ensure that adaptations of Romeo andJuliet will not be treated as criminal contraband .... If any
overbreadth does exist, it can... be corrected on a case-by-case basis.") (footnote omitted); cf.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he government should not
be foreclosed from enacting a regulation of virtual child pornography that contains an appropriate
affirmative defense .... ").
83. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256. It is true that "[a] defendant charged with
possessing, as opposed to distributing, proscribed works may not defend on the ground that the film
depicts only adult actors." Id. at 256. Note, however, that even if the affirmative defense is
"incomplete," it is only one means of correcting overbreadth on a case-by-case analysis. Id. at 256.
The Court might, for example, simply choose to read the statute more narrowly based on legislative
history. See supranote 70 and accompanying text. Thus, an impeccably drafted affirmative defense
is not necessary to a statute's constitutionality.
84. See id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("[L]itigants... bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that the regulation forbids a substantial
amount of... harmless speech.... Respondents have not made such a demonstration.") (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
85. See id. at 251-52.
86. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, I ATT'Y GEN. COMM'NON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REP.
649 (1986); see also David B. Johnson, Comments, Why the Possession of Computer-Generated
Child Pornography Can Be Constitutionally Prohibited, 4 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 311, 327
(""'Child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing child victims."') (quoting
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 n.7 (1990) (quoting I ATT'YGEN. COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY,
supra,at 649)).
87. Cf Johnson,supra note 86, at 327 ("[P]rohibiting the possession of computer-generated
child pornography will prevent pedophiles from using these images to seduce children into sexual
activity.").
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is a tool for seduction, regardless of whether other innocent materials can
be used for similar purposes.8
Second, virtual child pornography "whets the appetites" of
pedophiles. s9 The instant Court concluded that such an incitement
argument is unsound because it attempts to control a person's private
thoughts.90 Accordingly, the instant Court used the premise that "speech
is the beginning of thought."'" The Court reasoned that if the government
regulates virtual pornography, a form of speech, it will thereby be
regulating thoughts.9 2 However, speech is not the beginning of thought.93
This proposition rings true if one ponders a simple idea-it is impossible
to have an ambiguous thought.94 If ambiguity is not a part of thought, then
speech, laden with ambiguity, cannot be the basis of thought.9 5 Thus, one
might question the soundness of this premise that the instant Court uses to
refute the Government's incitement argument.9 6

88. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at I11.
89. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253.
90. See id.("The government 'cannot .. .premise legislation on the desirability of controlling
a person's private thoughts."') (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)).
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. One cognitive psychology expert states: "Ifone string of words in English can correspond
to two meanings in the mind, meanings in the mind cannot be strings of words in English.... So
the statements in a knowledge system are not sentences in English but rather inscriptions in a richer
language of thought, 'mentalese."' STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS 70 (1997).
94. See id. at 297 ("[T]houghts, virtually by definition, cannot be ambiguous."). Thus, if
anything, thought is the beginning of speech, not the other way around.
95. See id.
96. Interestingly, other arguments against the CPPA espouse premises that are empirically
unsound. For example, one professor contests the idea that virtual child pornography may whet the
appetites ofpedophiles: "In fact, viewing virtual child pornography may produce the opposite effect
and alleviate the desire to pursue actual children." Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual
Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 339, 464 (1997) (citing
Carlin Myer, Reclaiming Sexfrom the Pornographers: CybersexualPossibilities 83 GEO. L.J. 1969,
1999-2003 (1995)). Such a theory is suspect. One can trace such a catharsis theory back to Aristotle
and Freud. However, science has discovered that the converse of the catharsis theory is closer to
truth. For example, one expert states:
Many Americans have bought the idea, ... [that] "[slexual materials provide an
outlet for bottled-up impulses ... " If viewing erotica provides an outlet for sexual
impulses, then people should afterward experience diminished sexual desire ....
But experiments show the opposite is true .... The near consensus among social
psychologists is that catharsis does not occur as Freud ...

supposed ....

For

example, Robert Arms and his associates report that ... spectators of football,
wrestling, and hockey games exhibit more hostility after viewing the event than
before.
DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 421 (6th ed. 1999) (first emphasis added) (internal citation
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Third, the similarity of virtual versus actual child pornography makes
it difficult to prosecute actual child pornographers.97 Such a policy
consideration does not "turn the First Amendment upside down," as the
Court asserted.9" If technology frustrates the prosecution of unprotected
speech, the Government may, vis-A-vis such technology, regulate a
"narrow category" of protected speech.99 Moreover, here, the "narrow
category," child pornography, is arguably low-value speech, thus making
its regulation more permissible.'0 °
One might question the wisdom and logical consistency of the instant
Court's ruling. For instance, the Court noted that legitimate productions
depicting children engaging in sexual activity remind us of "years we
ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous ....
"'01
Paradoxically, the instant Court recognizes the sanctity of childhood years
only to overturn a statute designed to safeguard the interests of children,
morality, and society." 2 However, if wounds are so grievous at this
formative stage, perhaps the Court should further children's welfare by
banning virtual child pornography, which may, directly or indirectly,
inflict wounds on the young. 103

omitted).
97. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 67.
99. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring). "[I]f technological
advances thwart prosecution of 'unlawful speech,' the Government may well have a compelling
interest in barring or otherwise regulating some narrow category of 'lawful speech .... '; Id.; cf
id. at 264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[G]iven the
rapid pace of advances in computer-graphics techonology, the Government's concern is
reasonable.").
100. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) ("The value of permitting...
photographic reproductions of childien engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if
not de minimis."); Wasserman, supra note 51, at 260 ("[T]he 'less valuable speech' approach
registers ... prominently in Ferber."); id. at 277 ([V]irtual child pornography, like 'real' child
pornography, has little, if any, social value.").
101. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 248.
102. Here, one might say that the majority's argument deconstructs; i.e., the majority
inadvertently exposes assumptions that would lead to the opposite result of its contentions. See
generally JACQUES DERRIDA, STRUCTURE, SIGN, AND PLAY IN THE DISCOURSE OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES (Lecture at Johns Hopkins University (1966)), reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY SINCE

1117 (Hazard Adams ed., rev. ed. 1992) (expounding the basic tenets of deconstruction, a
mode of hermeneutical analysis).
103. See Johnson, supranote 86, at 330 ("With computer-generated child pornography, there
is a victim. The child who gets seduced by a pedophile using computer-generated child
pornography is a victim.").
PLATO
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